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THE CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE
OF ECONOMIC REFORM
Richard Layard
In this paper I give an impressionistic account of the situation in
Russia in September 1994 and its implications for Western aid priorities.
Considering the starting point, the progress of the reform has been
remarkable.  In the  paper I discuss it under the three traditional headings:
privatisation, liberalisation and stabilisation, which are listed here in
descending order of success.  I then add a section on the social management
of the transition.
1.  Privatisation and Restructuring
As is well known, the programme of privatisation of large and
medium sized industry has gone extremely fast.  With a few exceptions the
voucher privatisation  programme ended at the end of June 1994 and by
then 70% of workers in industrial enterprises were in privatised firms.  The
next phase of privatisation will be sale for cash, and will cover the
remaining shares in already privatised enterprises as well as most of the
enterprises not so far privatised.
There is some dispute about how `real' the privatisation has been.  In
most enterprises the managers and workers have ended up with at least
51% of the shares.  However, this will not be the final pattern of
ownership, and there are already signs of secondary selling of workers
shares either to managers or to outside owners.  The GKI claim that in
most of the privatisations a significant outside owner emerged in the
process of exchange of shares for vouchers.  But there are little data about
how far these single owners are simply a front for the managers or
genuinely external.
The main problem facing privatised enterprises is how to restructure.
This requires two skills which are lacking:  the ability and factual
knowledge necessary to appraise the future market prospects for products
which the enterprise could produce, and the ability to undertake financial
planning and control.
Every single enterprise in Russia needs technical assistance.  How is
this to be provided?  It cannot be done mainly by direct foreign aid.  It has
to be done by Western companies who are commercially engaged in the
future of Russian enterprises.  But a major obstacle to this is the difficulty
which Russian enterprises have in finding appropriate Western partners
with whom to trade or with whom to undertake joint investments.  There
would therefore be a huge pay-off to money devoted to marriage-broking
to enable Russian firms to find appropriate Western partners.  This would
2also be of great benefit to the European economy where Western firms
often know that somewhere in Russia there is the right producer for them
to buy from or to invest in, but have no idea of who that producer is.
I would therefore urge the EC to consider devoting some money to
sending industrial experts on short visits of a week or so to thousands of
companies to:
(i) make a quick and dirty appraisal of which parts of each firm are
worth trying to market to foreign traders or investors;
(ii) help the firm produce a brochure;
(iii) give the firm some telephone numbers of Western firms; and
(iv) make some telephone calls on their behalf.
The second huge difficulty is the complete absence of financial
expertise in Russian enterprises.  This suggests the overwhelming
importance of commercial education in the Russian transformation.  The
absolutely first step is a crash programme of translation and distribution of
Western material with a minimal amount of necessary adaptation, so that
there is something available in hundreds of thousands of copies for
Russians to study about business planning and financial control.  At the
same time a major programme of teacher training is needed to train
teachers who will help to train a quarter of the Russian labour force to
undertake commercial operations in the modern market economy.  (This is
about the proportion of people in the West directly engaged in commerce.)
I have not mentioned the small privatisation programme where again
approximately 70% of small enterprises in retail, public catering, hotel and
repair services are now in private hands.  The process whereby these
enterprises are being modernized is in many cases fairly slow.  Some
Western assistance to small business development is clearly helpful, and
much is already being provided. 
2.  Liberalisation
The first step in creating a market is to free prices and the action
taken on January 2nd 1992 was surely one of the bravest acts ever taken by
any government.  It was almost wholly successful and queues have steadily
diminished to quite normal proportions, except where some local price
controls continue.  Markets for intermediate products have also developed
quite well, though state orders still prevail to a considerable extent in trade
between the FSU states.
Despite the effective liberalisation of most prices other than housing
and utilities, there is still a completely inordinate amount of regulation on
a national and local level.  Permission has to be sought to produce a
particular good, a quota has to be obtained to export oil, and so on.  All the
time the amount of regulation is being reduced.  We are promised that by
3the 1st of January the remaining export quotas will have been abolished
except for a few strategic goods.  But this is an area where continuous
pressure is necessary.  From this point of view Russia is fortunate to have
as a deputy minister of economy responsible for economic reform Sergei
Vasiliev, and it is also expected that he will be secretary to Mr
Chernomyrdin's new commission on economic reform.  He is certainly the
most radical of all the ministers.  He almost single-handedly achieved the
deregulation of coal prices last year, and he can be relied on to keep
pushing for deregulation on all fronts.   For this policy to be successful,
however, it becomes necessary to have an effective system for maintaining
the necessary regulation of natural monopolies, and this is an important
area where western experience can help.  The rest of anti-monopoly policy
is a more difficult area and strong interests come into play.  Probably the
best form of anti-monopoly policy is free trade, where reciprocal
arrangements with the EC are vital.
The Russian approach to international trade has of course involved
a move from  the control of exports to the control of imports.  However,
the import tariff has not yet become excessively high, and it is important
that external pressure be maintained to keep it down.  The foreign exchange
market functions fairly effectively, and the exchange rate has been unified
for some time.  This is a major achievement.
3.  Stabilisation
The main area in which progress has not been continuous is monetary
control.  This was quite good in early 1992 and inflation fell to 10% per
month by August 1992.  But there was then a surrender to the industrial
lobby, and inflation was around 20-25% per month up to August 1993.
However the ground for dis-inflation had already been laid earlier in 1993
by Boris Federov, and inflation has come steadily down since August 1993
to an estimated 6% in July 1994.
Forecasting is difficult in this area.  But no one should underestimate
the dryness of the Russian Ministry of Finance.  They have a strong
commitment to not borrowing more money from the Central Bank than has
been provided for in the Budget, and therefore not spending more money
than that amount plus whatever they happen to manage to collect in taxes.
It is therefore not surprising that the gloomy prognoses put out at the
beginning of this year have turned out to be false.  It is most unlikely that
inflation will again become very high unless there is a change of
government. 
Real interest rates in Russia are now among the highest in the world
(6% or more a month) and this has led to a sensible value for the rouble,
giving a dollar wage of approximately $100 a month.  Since Russia has
4extraordinary natural resources we can expect that over the next few years
the dollar wage will increase further.  But the balance of payments is not
likely to become a major issue in Russia.
In the meantime output in Russia has continued to fall.  Nobody
knows the true path of the GDP and almost certainly the measured fall in
industrial production exaggerates the true figure.  In addition, it's hardly
likely to be true that in the last year output in services in Russia fell by 9%
and in industry by 25%, making a 17% fall in GDP.  The strongest
evidence against this is the independent evidence that real consumption has
risen by about 5% over the last year, which seems consistent with common
sense impressions.  Since Russian measured GDP has already fallen by
50% since 1989, compared with something like 10% in Poland, 20% in
Hungary, 30% in Bulgaria and 40% in Romania, it seems unlikely that the
Russian GDP has much further to fall.  While it is true that Russia was
more militarized than the other Warsaw Pact countries, it is also true that
Russia has more natural resource potential and scientific potential than
most of the other countries and this gives an ability to finance investment
which is not everywhere possible.
Probably, the Russians have now something like $50 billion in fairly
liquid form:  $15 billion in enterprise deposits at Russian banks, $15
billion in currency, and $20 billion overseas.  As soon as it becomes
evident that political stability is real and financial stability is real, there will
be an investment boom (which has already begun to some extent in private
house-building).  Once such a boom begins, foreign-owned money is likely
to come in quite strongly as well.  Given the degree of Western interest in
Russia, there is no reason why the Russian economy should not be growing
well above the world average in the second half of this decade.
The Russian finance of investment will of course occur in numerous
completely unorthodox ways and not exclusively via banks.  However, the
role of the banking system is critical.  The Russian banking system has
progressed remarkably quickly and is the highest-prestige employer in
Russia.  It has received a good deal of technical assistance.  But this will
not prevent a number of bank failures.  However, bank failures (just like
the failure of MMM) are not likely to slow down the progress of capitalism
in Russia.
4.  Social Protection
In the Russian transition a huge number of people have to change
their jobs.  Can this be achieved without mass unemployment?  Russia has
in fact already achieved a massive redeployment of labour with a tiny
increase in unemployment (unemployment only rose by 1.5% between
1992 and mid-1994).  In 1993 no less than 20% of Russian workers were
5hired into jobs.  Unemployment has been avoided through a massive fall in
productivity in industrial enterprises, which has not led to the bankruptcy
of the enterprises because of one of the highest degrees of wage flexibility
ever recorded in history.  Thus wages in the textile industry have fallen to
one eighth of those in the gas industry.  In this way firms have been enabled
to satisfy the earnest desire of workers to remain in their old enterprise
until a better job comes around.  This is in many ways a quite efficient
method effecting the transition, provided the workers retained in the old
industries are genuinely and actively looking for new work.  This appears
to be the case.  In many enterprises there is a system of work-sharing,
whereby a fraction of workers are sent home on involuntary leave
(currently about 2% of the total workforce at any one time) and another
group are on reduced hours (currently about 4% of the total workforce).
This amount of hidden unemployment seems far more desirable than open
unemployment of the long-term variety which has developed in Poland.
Whether Russia will be able to continue such luck with lowish
unemployment after bankruptcies become more common remains to be
seen.
The Federal Bankruptcy Agency is instructed to sell insolvent
enterprises, but how widespread bankruptcies will become is rather
doubtful.  It seems much more likely that there will be continued slimming,
and spontaneous break-up of enterprises rather than major closures.  The
biggest problems will not be in the big cities but in the cities of around 50
thousand where there is a single dominant enterprise employing say 5
thousand workers.
It is crucial that in all these cases there is adequate provision of
retraining, and public works to keep active those workers who have to be
made redundant.
(i) The development of retraining facilities has been very slow, largely
due to the deplorable absence of teaching materials.  A recent survey
of training centres shows that all the courses in strongest demand
were in commercial subjects where there are barely any teaching
materials and any teachers qualified to teach.  This should be one of
the top priorities for all the foreign aid agencies.
(ii) Public works.  The development of a coherent  strategy for the local
economic development of some areas, including useful public works,
has now become a top priority.  It is extremely important to bring to
bear whatever experience has been developed in Western Europe for
rejuvenating areas whose industry is declining.  This is especially
important in Russia where physical mobility is particularly difficult
due to the housing situation.
6A major problem in restructuring are the social assets of enterprises.
All the forces of the tax system weigh against the devolution of these assets
to local authorities.  For example, the maintenance of these assets counts
as a cost which an enterprise can set against profits tax.  If that cost was not
there higher profit tax receipts would go from the local area to Moscow,
thereby making the local area worse off.  Equally, if the enterprise
increased wages to enable the workers to pay for their social facilities this
would attract massive wage taxation, which is avoided by the direct
payment of benefits in kind.  We should not therefore expect to see any
very rapid reduction in the social assets of enterprises.  This in turn exposes
those people who leave enterprises to dangers of major deprivation.
Perhaps the most worrying thing of all in Russia is the health care
system.  This was never very strong and is in a state of severe crisis, which
is surely one reason why the death rate in Russia rose in one year by 20%
(1992-1993), and is still rising, though less sharply.  The problem here is
connected with the general budgetary crisis and could be considerably
improved if the government were strong enough to cut industrial subsidies
(the "national economy" line in the Budget currently receives 9% of the
GDP).
Studies of income distribution show that pensioners are not on
average as poor as the Russian population as a whole.  The greatest poverty
is in large families (as in most countries) and can only be tackled by a
restructuring of child benefits with some kind of means testing.  
Apart from the health care situation, there is no sense in which the
social safety net in Russia has failed so far.  In fact, it is remarkable how
smoothly the transition has gone, with remarkably little social tension.  It
is interesting that those who voted for Zhirinovsky averaged incomes
higher than the national average, and their average age was below the
national average.  They voted against crime, not against poverty.
5.  Conclusion
The Russian people have very little faith in the ability of politicians
to do very much for them.  This is an excellent background against which
to build a market economy.  The West can provide invaluable help
precisely in those areas which involve the development of market
capabilities - above all, contact with effective business partners and the
development of skills to operate in the commercial occupations where
opportunities are virtually unlimited.
7REMARKS MADE IN PRESENTING THE PAPER
I am grateful to the Commission for giving me the opportunity to be
involved in this programme which has certainly been an extraordinarily
worthwhile experience for me.  The paper "The Current State and Future
of Economic Reform" is a very broad brush one and I will speak in an even
more broad brush way which might be appropriate to get us started.
On the General Russian Economic Situation:
I have always been optimistic about the Russian economy which is
the reason why I was there at the beginning.  I think that on the whole this
optimism has been justified.  What I felt at the beginning, even before the
coup, was that most Russians had become disenchanted with the State and
the ability of the State to organise their lives.  They had been impressed by
the fact that there was something better in the West which they basically
felt had to be copied.  And in order to copy it they also started realising that
they would have to join the West.  This was the fundamental thought which
has been driving the situation all along and the factor which explains why,
despite all the various crises, actually things have been moving forward.
A very important issue, certainly for the Commission, is whether it
is likely that at any point in the future this underlying state of mind of the
Russian people may change and the door may shut.  I think this is most
unlikely.  I think that the "magic" of the dollar is extraordinary in Russia at
the moment; a lot of people have dollars and for them it is some sort of
symbol of the new life.  Surely they don't want to get cut off from that
source of prosperity.  So I think that it is very unlikely that we shall see a
closing up of Russia or a reversal of the move to the market.
This however is a very different issue to the question of whether
Democracy will survive in Russia.  There is surely at least a 10% chance
of some kind of autocracy.  But I don't believe that economic policy would
be any different under one regime or the other.
It is interesting to see the results of a recent survey of the army
officers; 95% of them said that they would prefer to have a dictatorship
and I think that a very high proportion of the Russian population would as
well, the main reason of course being crime.  They want a leadership which
can effectively deal with crime.  But when the officers were asked who they
would like to be their leader, Zhirinovsky was way down in their
preferences at around 10%.  It became obvious that they don't want
someone who would cut them off from the West.
So if one asks what could reverse the economic reform, I think that
the only thing that could really do it would be some provocative reform
8action, which would have some damaging short term effect and thus unite
the opposition against the reform process.  The basic objective of
economic policy of all the Governments in Russia over the last couple of
years has been to avoid a provocative action.  It was absolutely clear from
early on that what was to happen would be gradualist.
I will offer two illustrations of this gradualist process and the highly
political way in which things happen; the first in relation to the process of
disinflation and stabilisation (or the lack of it) and the other in relation to
unemployment.
It was clear to me in early 1993 when inflation was very high, that it
couldn't be reduced by any of the "normal processes".  And it seemed to me
quite likely that it would be reduced by a gradual disinflation.  Nearly all
economists were saying then that gradual disinflation was a very unlikely
remedy; there was only one precedent - that of Chile - which was not
considered a very desirable one.  However, this is what has been happening.
There is no appetite for macroeconomic shocks and for declaratory
statements.  If you have a macroeconomic shock you have to have
declaratory statements in order to try and generate credibility.
I came to understand all this at the very beginning because there was
a lot of feeling that the Government wasn't explaining what it was doing,
particularly to the Western community.  We were asked to provide advice
in the compilation of a document to be sent to President Bush in January
1992, before Yeltsin went to see him to explain the Government strategy.
It was a terrific document, very persuasive, which described a sound and
coherent strategy.  Having been involved in the preparation of the
document we asked our Russian counterparts why they did not publish it
in Russian.  They answered that anything that you put out provides
somebody with a stick to beat you with.  Their intention not to give any
precise statements of what they were doing was thus clear.
Another experience I had which is also relevant to the disinflation
issue had to do with wages policy.  Again around the same time we were
asked to do some work at the Ministry of Labour on an incomes policy
which would aim at reducing the rate of growth of wages.  Perhaps not
surprisingly we came up with a proposal on the lines of the Polish
"popivek" but we also discussed the alternative of an excess wage tax - not
where you have a norm for the rate of growth of wages, but where you just
have some tax on wages that lie above a cut-off point.  We said that of
course it would be better to have a norm for the growth of wages which
would also have a welcome declaratory effect.  That was precisely what
Gaidar's administration rejected.  They chose instead the excess wage tax
that they have now and they were right!  Surely the one way to have created
conflict in Russia would have been actually to do what Western
9economists, including myself, thought that it was a good thing to have, that
is a declaratory statement about the rate of wage growth.
The result of this gradualism has been an extraordinary degree of
industrial peace.  Russian strike-days are at 1% of the OECD average,
which is amazing given the difficulty of the transition.  I think that it is very
difficult for Westerners to say that it should have been done very much
differently.
A second example of this gradualism is reflected in unemployment.
Most Western economists expected a sharper rise in unemployment and
some thought that this was even desirable.  In fact, unemployment has been
rising and it continues to rise at a rate of 1% per annum.  There have been
extraordinarily few lay-offs (1.5% of the workforce in 1993 - possibly
slightly more than that now).  But basically there has been a huge re-
deployment of labour through massive wage cuts in the unsuccessful
enterprises.  Workers have chosen to stay in these enterprises until they
could find something else.  They have accepted these wage cuts and
eventually they have moved out to better jobs.  This is of course exactly
what the OECD jobs study on the European economy said should be
happening in Western Europe; it has been happening in Russia instead.  But
it is partly of course a matter of policy decision by the oblast
administrations in particular, reflecting their desire to avoid social conflict.
These two episodes, the disinflation episode and the unemployment
episode, reflect the very tight interrelation between politics and economics.
There is no point in saying that it is undesirable; it is the reality.  This raises
obvious issues about the role of Western economists in Russia.
On the Role of Western Economists in Russia:
There are three important areas of activity for Western economists in
such a heavily politicised environment.  The first is simply what might be
called the basic economic education of politicians and the general public.
The second is foreseeing issues which will arise - which is easier to do to
some extent if you come from outside - and making suggestions as to what
should be done.  The third is responding to very specific requests for policy
development by politicians.  As it is a little difficult to discuss these three
areas in abstract, I shall give some illustrations of our particular experience
in these respects.
1.  Provision of basic economic education
On basic economic education we have been trying to do four things.
First, through our work with the Working Centre for Economic Reform,
to assist its members - and particularly Sergei Vasiliev and Andrei
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Illarionov to sharpen their ability to make their case.  The main way we
have done this is by getting a clear and well documented account of what
has been happening.  They have found the Russian Economic Trends a very
useful tool in their political battles.  One of the most dramatic examples
was when Chernomyrdin became Prime Minister at the end of 1992, with
lots of negative ideas originally in his head.  But fortunately he continued
to rely on Vasiliev and Illarionov who had been introduced to their
positions by Gaidar.  They were reportedly spending a considerable amount
of time sitting with Chernomyrdin together going through graphs from
Russian Economic Trends.
A second thing that one can do in working with our partners is to
answer their questions as they face several conceptual difficulties.  I
remember being asked, how come IMF lending is not inflationary.  Taking
someone through the way foreign finance works in a budget is an example
of important things that Western economists can do.  Russians very often
want to know what is the foreign experience in a particular issue.  The
transfer of this knowledge is an obvious task for us to perform.
Policy makers we have been working with have wanted us also to
participate in the economic education of the Russian public.  So there have
been a series of on-going monthly press conferences at which we make a
report on the situation with an implicit interpretation of events that is
supportive of what needs to be done, without however lecturing people.
These press conferences have been reported widely in the press and on
Russian television.  We have also been encouraged to write articles in the
Russian press, give interviews etc.  On our side the distribution of material
in Russian has not been as good as it should have been until recently.  Now
we are distributing the Russian version of Russian Economic Trends to the
Federation Council and shortly to the Duma.
Outside the European Expertise Service, we have been involved in
the organisation of summer schools for students and teachers in economics
and we are now going to be involved in reforming the curriculum (through
the TEMPUS programme), which is also a very important activity.
A fourth form of service we have also helped to provide has been to
educate the Western public about Russia as there have often been grave
misunderstandings in the past.
2.  Looking ahead and providing advice
Making forward suggestions for issues that need to be addressed is
very important.  For example in early 1993, after privatisation had been
dealt with, it was obvious that the post-privatisation problem of how to get
finance for investment of a long-term kind, how to import know-how etc,
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would emerge.  We were very much involved in the drafting of proposals
to Finance Ministers in this direction.
3.  Responding to requests for policy advice by politicians
Illustration of this kind of activity is, for example, helping to develop
the plan for the reduction of credit growth, looking at implications
abolishing export quotas, and so on.  It is important in all those cases not
to be disheartened by the fact that things generally happen long after the
advice is supplied.  There is a long-term element inherent in the provision
of such advice.  But many of the things that Western economists have
suggested have happened.  A lot of them have happened six or even twelve
months after the time they were originally suggested, but they have
happened.
For instance, we are now faced with two urgent requests for
provision of specific advice:  (i) to work on the problem of weak
enterprises and provide advice on how to help their localities support
useful economic activity and how to organise the run-down of the old
employment in some kind of co-ordinated fashion with the stimulation of
new and more productive employment; (ii) to assist in tackling the huge
problem of output measurement.  As you may know, consumption is
estimated to be rising by 10% per annum and industrial production falling
by 25% per annum (!).  There is a bit of a problem there, and work needs
to be done in collaboration with Goskomstat in order to reconcile the
various measurements.
On the whole, in all of the above areas, advisors become more and
more able to contribute the longer they have been there.  It is partly the
issue of "Russian specifics", which we have often been accused of not
knowing.  It is true however that the more we come to know them, the
more we find out that we can be useful, not least because they are
instrumental in helping us build trust with the Russians we work with.
I have been asked to address the question of how can we as
economists function in a situation where there is a change of Government.
This question is hinting at the difference between the experience of all of
the Europeans present and that of J. Sachs and A. Aslund.  My view,
looking into the future, is that Russians expect policies to be made by
experts.  I remember when Gaidar was sacked and I asked a couple of taxi-
drivers what they thought of Chernomyrdin, they both said:  "he is a
chemist!  how can we have a chemist in charge of the economy?"  Russian
people like good specialists.  And good specialists are at the moment the
relatively modern group of economists which would include the Gaidar -
Shokhin groups but also the Sabirov group and the Yavlinsky group but not
the old guard (ie Petrakov etc).  It seems to me very likely that Russian
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economic policy will be made by a changing cast from the "modern group".
It is not terribly critical to us who these people will be.  What is critical is
that we ensure an affiliation to an institution rather than to individuals.
On Priorities for TACIS:
In my paper I mention two hobby horses I have been trying to
promote which are not strictly EES related issues.  I would wish to raise
them however as possible priorities for other parts of TACIS.  Areas where
there is a very high rate of return are those areas which Russians know very
little about.  Two such areas are:  (i)  commercial practise in a formal sense
(accounting, banking etc); and (ii) the position of Russian businesses in the
world market.  Finding ways of using economies of scale to help educating
them in these areas can maximise the returns.
It seems to me that there would be a huge pay off in enabling people
to educate themselves in modern commercial practise.  There is a total lack
of written material in modern commercial practise.  The translation and
necessary adaptation of Western texts on basic commercial practise would
cost very little and produce spectacular results.
Activity in the second area will help Russian businesses to define a
future for themselves.  We can't transfer the know-how of what is the
situation in the world market, in products related to what Russian firms
produce, on who might be interested in investing in particular firms etc.
This cannot be done through detailed consultancy.  Such know-how has to
be channelled through the normal way, which is none other than ordinary
commercial interchange.  The people who will carry the knowledge of the
world market, the best technological practise etc into Russian firms, are
Western commercial partners.  I feel that the Commission should be
putting some resources at least into helping the Russians to find the
Western partners who will then do the teaching.  Russian firms are
desperate in that they don't know who to ring up; at the same time western
firms don't know who to contact in Russia either.  I think that a marriage
broking service organised by TACIS will bring incredibly high yield.
To conclude, the future for economic policy advice is there; we can
operate in any likely political context; we are needed; and we each have
different kinds of comparative advantage to offer.  Of course, in the end,
our chief aim should be to do ourselves out of a job.
